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section 541(c)(2) did not encompass 
the restrictions on alienation of plan 
benefits in 29 U.S.c. § 1 056( d)( 1). 
Rather, the trustee argued that the term 
referred "only to plans with transfer re-
strictions enforceable under state spend-
thrift trust law." Moore, 907 F.2d at 
1477. The court of appeals rejected the 
trustee's overly restrictive interpretation 
of section 541 ( c ) (2) and held that the 
term was not limited to state spendthrift 
trust law. Id. 
First, the court found nothing in the 
plain language of section 541 ( c)( 2) to 
suggest that the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" refers exclusively to 
state law. The court stated that the lan-
guage means exactly what it says, thus 
encompassing all laws, state and federal, 
under which a restriction on transfer 
can be enforced. Id 
Furthermore, the court found that the 
identical language in other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code had been deter-
mined to apply to federal as well as state 
law. For example, in In re Ahead By a 
Length, Inc., lOO B.R 157 (Banke., 
S.D.N.Y. 1989), the bankruptcy court 
found "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
within the provisions of 11 U.S.c. 
§ 1 08( a) to include, inter alia, the Rack-
eteer Influence and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act. The court thus concluded that 
it would be "incongruous to give the 
same phrase in Section 541(c)(2) a 
narrower construction than the identi-
cal phrase other parts of the Bankruptcy 
Code, particularly since the disparate 
sections of the Bankruptcy Code were 
enacted together in a single compre-
hensive statute." Moore, 907 F.2d at 
1478. The court further concluded that, 
had Congress intended the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" to encom-
pass only state law, it would have stated 
so explicitly, as it had in other sections 
oftheCode.Id. (citing 11 US.c. §522(b) 
(1) & (2)). 
Acknowledging the trustee's argu-
ment that several circuit courts have 
determined the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" in section 541(c)(2) 
to refer only to state spendthrift trust 
laws, the court distinguished those de-
cisions as involving self-settled trusts 
where the settlor was the beneficiary 
and had powers to amend or terminate 
the trust without penalty. Id In contrast, 
the beneficiaries of the Springs Indus-
tries' plan could not control the trust, 
could not borrow against it, and could 
not amend the trust. 
The court also rejected the trustee's 
appeal to the legislative history of sec-
tion 541(c)(2), finding such an ap-
proach inappropriate, since tl:te language 
of the statute was clear. Id. at 1478-79. 
Furthermore, the court noted that even 
if a review of the legislative history were 
relevant, it would be inconclusive. The 
court found that Congress' repeated 
emphasis on state spendthrift trust law 
in the legislative reports accompanying 
section 541(c)(2) indicated merely its 
intentions to include state spendthrift 
law within the restrictions of transfer 
enforceable under "applicable nonbank-
ruptcylaw." Id. at 1479. Thus,foundthe 
court, Congress was treating interests in 
plans containing valid spendthrift clauses 
in the same way as prior to the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, when such 
interests were not property of the bank-
rupt's estate. Id. The court reiterated, 
"[ n ]othing in the legislative history indi-
cates ... that Congress meant 'applicable 
nonbankruptcy law' to refer exclusively 
to state spendthrift trust law." Id. 
Having concluded that the term "appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law" may include 
federal law, the court went on to con-
sider the issue of whether ERISA consti-
tutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law" 
so that the debtors' interests in the 
ERISA-qualified plan were properly ex-
cluded from the estates under section 
541(c)(2). The court found that the 
primary purpose of ERISA was to secure 
employees' retirement income so that a 
worker promised a retirement benefit 
would actually receive it. Id. ERISA 
secures pension benefits primarily by 
restricting the assignment and aliena-
tion of those benefits. Id. at 1480. Be-
cause these non-alienability provisions 
deny general creditors, as well as plan 
participants, access to vested benefits, 
the court concluded that ERISA "consti-
tutes 'applicable nonbankruptcy law' 
under which restrictions on the transfer 
of pension interests may be enforced." 
Id. Thus, the court concluded, "'[u]nder 
the plain and simple language of section 
541 ( c)( 2), if the ERISA anti-alienation 
provisions are enforceable against gen-
eral creditors, they are enforceable 
against the bankruptcy trustee. '" Id. 
at 1478 (quotingIn re Threewitt, 24 B.R 
927,929 (D. Kan. 1982)). 
In finding ERISA to constitute appli-
cable nonbankruptcy law within the 
meaning of section 541(c)(2) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
ensured that neither the vagaries of state 
laws, nor the particularities of state 
spendthrift trust law would continue to 
threaten the security of employee retire-
ment benefits, thus furthering ERISA's 
purpose of uniform treatment of pen-
sion benefits across the country. 
- Mary Jo Murphy 
Mandel tJ. O'Hara: GOVERNOR 
ENJOYS ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
BASED ON APPROVAL OR VETO 
OF LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS. 
In Mandel v. O'Hara, 320 Md. 103, 
576 A.2d 766 (1990), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that a gover-
nor could not be held liable for damages 
in tort based upon his veto or approval 
of legislation. The absolute immunity is 
of the same type which members of the 
General Assembly enjoy when voting for 
or against legislative bills and applies 
even if corrupt motives underlie the 
exercise of power. 
During 1971, Marlboro racetrack 
made an agreement to buy eighteen rac-
ing days from another track which con-
ducted horse racing with parimutuel 
betting. The General Assembly approved 
the transfer which subsequently was 
vetoed by Governor Mandel. As a result, 
James F. O'Hara, III and Michael P. 
O'Hara sold their stock in Marlboro. 
Thereafter, the General Assembly over-
rode the veto and Marlboro merged 
with another entity that conducted horse 
racing with parimutuel betting. 
The O'Haras brought suit against the 
governor and others, based on a theory 
of conspiracy. They contended that by 
vetoing the bill, Governor Mandel plan-
ned to depress the value of the Marlboro 
stock, acquire the stock, then restore its 
value by inducing the General Assembly 
to override the veto. At trial, the gover-
nor's motion for su~ary judgment 
based on absolute immunity was denied. 
Governor Mandel appealed to the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland where he 
was granted a stay. The court of appeals 
granted certiorari before determination 
on the merits to determine if a Governor 
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of Maryland enjoyed absolute immunity 
when vetoing or approving legislation. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
began its analysis by noting that it was 
undisputed that some degree of public 
official immunity applied to the gover-
nor when performing gubernatorial 
duties involving the exercise of discre-
tion. Mandel, 320 Md. at 107,576 A.2d 
at 768. The question before the court 
was whether such immunity was abso-
lute or qualified. An absolute immunity 
from tort liability, the court stated, 
"stands even if the official acts in bad 
faith, or with malice or corrupt motives, 
and protects both judges and legislators, 
so long as their acts are 'judicial' or legis-
lative in nature." Id. (quoting Prosser & 
Keeton, ]be Law of Torts, § 132, at 1056-
57 (5th ed. 1984)). Governor Mandel 
argued that his veto/approval function 
was a legislative one, and therefore 
should be protected to the same extent 
as legislators. 
Due to the lack of Maryland prece-
dence regarding gubernatorial immu-
nity specifically, the court based its 
analysis on cases dealing with 42 US.C. 
§1983, a statute which the court be-
lieved to be the driving force in the 
development of public official immu-
nity. Section 1983 allows suits against 
public officials who have caused the 
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws ... " 42 US.C. §1983 (1982). 
The cases, as noted by the court of 
appeals, took a "functional" approach to 
immunity law in that '" [t ]he scope of 
immunity is determined by function, not 
office.'" Mandel at 120, 576A.2d at 774 
(quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 us. 
731,785 (1982) (White,].,dissenting)). 
The court of appeals found that when 
applied to cases dealing with executive 
immunity, the functional approach pro-
duced disparate results. In Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, for example, the Supreme Court 
suggested that a governor would enjoy 
qualified immunity for his deployment 
of National Guard units. The Court anal-
ogized such action to possible arrest 
situations confronted by police officers 
whose actions are subject to good faith. 
Mandel at 117, 576 A.2d at 772 (citing 
Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 US. 232 (1974)). 
In contrast, the Court found in Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 US. 420 (1976) that a 
state prosecutor's function of initiating 
and presenting a case was covered by 
absolute immunity since the discretion 
involved was similar to that of a judge. 
"Thus, '[a]lthough a qualified immunity 
from damages liability should be the 
general rule for executive officials[,] ... 
there are some officials whose special 
functions require a full exemption from 
liabililty.'" Mandel, at 120, 576 A.2d at 
774 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 
US. 478,508 (1978)). 
When applying the functional ap-
proach to the facts sub judice, the court 
of appeals found that the function of the 
veto, '''as a matter of historical develop-
ment as well as theory[,] ... [was] a 
legislative power.'" Id. at 121-22, 576 
A.2d at 775 (quoting E. Mason, The Veto 
Power, 100 (A Hart. ed. 1967)). As 
such, the exercise of gubernatorial veto 
power requires that it is absolutely 
immune from tort liability. Id. The court 
explained that the act of deliberating on 
the constitutionality, justice, and public 
expediency of legislative measures be-
fore deciding whether or not to exer-
cise veto power was "plainly the func-
tion of a legislator." Mandel at 122, 576 
A.2d at 775 ( quoting People v. Bowmen, 
21 N.Y. 517, 521-22 (1860)). 
In support of its conclusion, the court 
next cited Hernandez v. City of 
Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (1982), in 
which the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit squarely held that 
there is absolute legislative immunity 
under §1983, which encompassed the 
executive veto function. Mandel, at 126-
27,576 A.2d at 777-78. In Hernandez, 
the court of appeals stated that '''[t]he 
mayor's veto, like the veto of the Presi-
dent or a state governor, is undeniably a 
part of the legislative process.'" Id. 
(quoting Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 
643 F.2d at 1193-94 (1982)). 
The court rejected the O'Haras' argu-
ment that the governor must be exercis-
ing the state's entire legislative power 
on the subject at issue in order to assert 
absolute immunity. The court did not 
accept such language as a condition 
precedent to absolute immunity, but 
rather found that it could be asserted for 
lesser delegations, such as the power to 
veto. 
By equating the governor's veto power 
to a legislative function, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland specifically noted 
that it was confining its holding to the 
point of intersection of executive and 
legislative powers. Therefore, although 
a Governor of Maryland is an elected 
official, he will nonetheless enjoy abso-
lute immunity when exercising his con-
stitutionally mandated power in a legiS-
lative capacity. 
Mandel represents a Significant broad-
ening of the immunity doctrine in an 
area which had never been considered 
in regard to the highest executive offi-
cial of the state. Specifically, a Governor 
of Maryland enjoys absolute immunity 
when exercising the official function of 
vetoing or approving legislation, regard-
less of the motives that may underlie the 
function. This is in accord with the abso-
lute immunity which the other branches 
of government have long enjoyed. By so 
ruling, the evidentiary problems that 
would arise if a governor were held 
accountable for every veto decision he 
made were avoided. So too was avoided 
the possible separation of powers prob-
lem that may occur if the judiciary was 
empowered with the ability to judge the 
acts of the executive when exercising 
duties which he is constitutionally 
bound to perform. The court's decision 
permits such judgment to remain with 
the governor's constituents, where it 
belongs. 
- Lesley M. Brand 
Taxiera fl. Malkus: AFTER-BORN 
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN HAVE 
A RIGHT TO ESTABLISH 
PATERNITY OF THEIR 
DECEASED PUTATIVE FATHER 
In Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 
578 A.2d 761 (1990), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland ruled that an illegit-
imate child born after her alleged father's 
death has the right to establish the 
paternity of her putative father. In so 
holding, the court stated that such an 
interpretation of Maryland's paternity 
statutes conforms with the legislature'S 
intentions of promoting the welfare and 
best interests of children born out of 
wedlock. 
Elaine Taxiera, a Delaware resident, 
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Dor-
chester County against Frederick Mal-
kus, the Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Levi Brown, Jr. Id. at 473, 578 
A.2d at 762. She sought a declaration 
under §1-208 of the Estates and Trusts 
Article that Brown was the father of her 
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